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Technical Change in Developing countries: A Dynamic Model of 
Adoption, Learning and Industry Evolution 
 
Asma Raies, CED-TEAM University of Paris1 Pantheon – Sorbonne. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
         This paper develops and analyses a dynamic model, which combines both the adoption and the industry 
evolution theories. We model the decision of adoption, learning entry and exit of firms. These decisions depend 
on the interaction of technology characteristics ((effectiveness, machinery and information costs…) and other 
economic indicators (firm’s size, technology capability, competition concentration, returns of scale,…). We use 
the model’s theoretical results to analyze simultaneously the effects on the structure and the average efficiency 
of the industry and to develop a framework for understanding the effect of competitive policy reform and public 
policy action necessary to enhance adoption and average productivity. The model we suggest also analyses 
effects on industry evolution and social welfare. 
 
     Keywords: Adoption, learning, efficiency, entry , exit, industrial dynamics, evolution, developing countries.  
   JEL- Classifications: L1, L11, L22, L25, O3, O31, and O33.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
         Much of the theoretical modeling in new growth theory has been in the context of the industrialized 
countries and focused primarily on R&D expenditures and investments in human physical capital as 
determinants of technological evolution. In developing economies, in contrast, where technologies are imported 
from industrialized countries, the R&D is oriented to the technological efforts that can enable firms to reach 
“best practice” levels of adopted technologies and that determine the intensity with which industrial technologies 
already used by firms are changed by continuing adaptation and incremental improvement. . 
        Experience in developing countries indicates that these technical adoption and learning process are far more 
complex and demanding. The use of imported technologies, at or near “the best practice” level of technical 
efficiency for which it was designed, requires firms to seek new information, skills, material inputs, investment 
resources and management organizations .The adoption of innovations is not an automatic or passive process, in 
these countries, and the technological success of this adoption is uncertain.  
       Differences in firm-specific initial endowments of technological capabilities and entrepreneurial ability 
facilitate technological success by particular firms. Over time these firms learn more effectively than other 
enterprises and they may stay ahead or widen the technology gap. As a consequence, the technological adoption 
and learning processes, themselves, inevitably create technology gaps and affect the structure and the 
heterogeneity of the industry. 
       Developing countries appear to suffer from a significant technology gap between national and foreign firms. 
Part of this gap appears to be due to a great deal of heterogeneity in efficiency across firms in developing 
countries. The main policies suggested are the intensification of the competition by exposing national firms to 
world competition and eliminating artificial restraints to competition such that barriers to entry; and the 
reallocation of resources away from less efficient firms to more efficient firms and sectors to improve aggregate 
productivity.  
        A key set of policy issues revolves around the relationship of inter-firm productivity differentials to firm 
size and employment creation. Researchers and policy makers have often associated the capacity to create 
employment with firm size. In developing economies, for example, micro-enterprises and small firms have often 
been viewed as important elements in the objectives of employment generation and poverty alleviation. To 
evaluate these policies and to find those which can have the greatest impact on increasing firm productivity and 
social welfare, we must focus simultaneously on both adoption and industrial evolution theories. 
         The purpose of this paper is to generalize previous studies by combining, both theories of adoption (Feder 
[1980], Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Feder, Just and Silberman [1984], Jensen (1992), Hoppe (2000) and 
others), and industry evolution (Jovanovic (1982), Lippman and Rumelt (1982), Gort and Klepper (1982), Dixit 
and Shapiro (1986), Jovanovic and Lach (1989), Ericson and Pakes (1989, 1990), Lambson (1991,1992), 
Hopenhayen (1992) D.B.Audretsch et Talat Mahmood (1994) and others). We present in the first section, a 
dynamic model of adoption and learning in which we formalize explicitly the firms’ entry and exit decisions, in a 
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market for a differentiated product with monopolistic competition. In the second section we analyze theoretical 
results relative to firms’ adoption, efficiency and industry concentration and average productivity. The effects on 
industry evolution and social welfare are discussed in other paper.  
 
THE MODEL  
 Demand side:  
 I formalize a monopolistic competition model, using a derivation of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence 
(1976). Each firm produces a unique brand of the same generic product. Hence, at any given time t, the number 
of firms operating, n (t), equals the number of varieties available to consumers. 
The preference ordering of identical consumers is described by the inter-temporal utility function:                                      
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Where )(0 tx  is the consumption of the numeraire in time t, and )( tC  is the consumption index of the  Dixit-
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Where )( ty j  is the amount of variety j of the differentiated product demanded by a consumer at time t.  The 
aggregate demand function  )( tY j for variety j at time t  is: 
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Where E is equal to the total instantaneous expenditure on the differentiated product and )( jp j is the price of 
variety j at time t. The demand function (3) is isoelastic with the elasticity of demand )1(/1 ασ −=  
 
Cost side: 
  The technology used by the firm is described by the cost function: FtytctC j
x
j
x
j += )()(ˆ)( . 
Where F is the fixed cost and )(ˆ tc xj  is the marginal cost. Across firms xcˆ ’s are random and take three possible 
values )(ˆ tc oj , )(ˆ tc lj and 
h
cˆ  with )(ˆ)(ˆˆ tctcc ojljh << . Firms experiencing )(ˆ tc oj are the lowest-efficiency 
(o-) firms, which still use the old technology. Those experiencing )(ˆ tc lj  , have adopted the new technology but 
they are still engaged in learning, adaptation and search efforts in order to succeed adoption and to use the new 
technology efficiently. Finally the high-efficiency (h-) firms which have achieved their successful adoption and 
learning process, use the new technology at the “best practice” level of technical efficiency for which it was 
designed ( hcˆ ). We assume that )( tc lj  follows a conditional distribution ))(/)1(( tctcF ljlj +  which is the 
probability of having a productivity equals to )1( +tc lj , in period t+1 given )( tc lj in period t. F is continuous in 
)( tc lj  and )1( +tc lj , strictly increasing in )( tc lj and is the same for all firms. We define the probability of 
adoption success of firm j, in period t, by ))(/( tccF ljh , which is the probability to use the new technology 
at the “best practice” level of technical efficiency ( hcˆ ) in period t+1 given )( tc lj in period t. 
Hypothesis 1: We assume that θ−= )(ˆ)( tctc xjxj  where )( tc xj  can be considered as an indicator of the x-
firm productivity, in period t. Thus θ−= )(ˆ)( tctc ojoj , θ−= )(ˆ)( tctc ljlj and 
θ−
=
hh cc ˆ . 
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Market equilibrium: 
 
It is assumed that firms discover their type at the beginning of each period. A firm j of type x ( x = o, l, h) which 
stays maximizes profits tj
x
jjj
x
j Ftytctytpt −−= )()(ˆ)()()(pi , subject to the demand curve it faces 
given in (3). The optimal pricing rules for firm j of type x is:   
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 Using this pricing rule, the profit expression of the firm j of type x is:  
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Hypothesis 2: We assume that txj cmtjAtc ),()( = with 0),( ≥tjA  for all j, is a continuous and 
monotonously decreasing function of the firm index j. That is, firms are ranked in terms of this parameter in such 
a way that more efficient firms have a lower index number. We assume a specific functional form for ),( tjA  , 
namely: 2)(0)(2
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 Where )( tε is an endogenous parameter measuring the industry concentration (or firms’ heterogeneity). We can 
see that higher values of this parameter imply a greater inter-firm variance in productivity and size. As )( tε  
converges to zero the industry becomes homogenous and ),( tjA converges to 1. 
Finally we can see that in the expression t
x
j cmtjAtc ),()( = the type of the firm does not matter. To make 
difference between (l-) and o-firms (which is necessary to avoid undetermined form and to solve the model) we 
assume that )(),(.)( tcmtjAltc tlj =  and )(),(.)( tcmtjAotc toj = . Where l and o are two different 
positive values very close to 1( logically l > o ). This hypothesis does not affect results since l and o are 
instrumental variables which will disappear by simplification).  
The expressions of the (l-) and o-firms profits can be written as follow: 
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 The value functions 
Potential entrants and incumbent firms maximize expected discounted profits. The problem of an incumbent firm 
using the old technology is defined recursively by:           

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Where ))(,( tctv ojoj gives the value of a firm j of type o, at period t. 0≥oS  is the o-firm’s opportunity cost of 
being in the industry. )( th j is the hazard rate or the new technology adoption probability, of firm j, in period t. 
The value of firm j of type l in period t, is :  
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Where iS is the opportunity cost of being in the industry of l- and h- firms. iS is assumed the same for an h-
firm or an l-firm. ))(/)1(( tctcF ljlj +  is defined above. This l-firms become of type h, in period t+1 if they 
succeed their adoption and learning process in period t, i.e.  1))(/( =tcchF lj . The h-firms’ value is: 
  
{ }),1(;max)(),( hhihjhhj ctvStctv ++= βpi                                                                         (9)       
   
Industry dynamics: 
    The composition of firms evolves in accordance with average probabilities of adoption (o-firms), of technical 
success (l-firms) and of entry and exit (o, l and h-firms). The number of h-firms evolves according to:  
)()()()()1( tnstnttntn hlhh −+=+ ρ                                                                                                  (10) 
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Thus )()( tnt lρ  is the number of l-firms, which have achieved, with success, their adoption and learning 
process and become high-efficiency firms. )( th is the average probability of adoption of o-firms, in period t, 
then: 
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Let )( tn a  the number of o-firms which adopt the new technology in period t, then )(.)()( tnthtn oa =  (13) 
The number of o-firms, )( ton , evolves according to: )()()()()1( tsntnetntntn ooaoo −+−=+            (14)  
)(tsn o  is the number of exit among non innovating firms of type o, at the end of period t (or at the beginning of 
period t+1). )( ten o  is the number of firms which enter the industry at the end of period t, using the old 
technology.  
       Let )( ten l the number of innovating entrants of type l and )( tns l the number of exits among l-firms. The 
total number of l-firms in period t+1 is: )()()()())(1()1( tnstentntnttn llall −++−=+ ρ     (15) 
Finally, the total number of active firms  in period t, )( tn , is: )()()()( tntntntn olh ++=                       (16) 
This total number evolves in according to: )()()()1( tsntentntn −+=+                                              (17) 
Where )( tsn is the total number of exits at the end of period t: )()()()( tsntnstnstsn olh ++= (18) 
)( ten is the total number of entry at the end of period t:  )()()( tnetnetne ol +=                                     (19) 
 
The adoption decision: 
    A firm aj maximizes the discounted value of total profits by choosing the adoption date T.  Denoting the total 
profit function as )(TjaΠ  the optimization problem of this firm is as follow: 
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This profit function can de differentiated with respect to T. One gets the first-order condition of the profit-
maximization problem: 
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 Where )(TXa  is the adoption cost of the new technology in period T. Txa is the derivative of )(TXa with 
respect to T. τ+T is the date of technical success of firm aj , such that 1))1(/( =−+τTccF ljah . At this 
date technical efficiency )( τ+Tc lja equals hc , thus: )()( τpiτpi +=+ TT ljah . Eqs (21) writes: 
[ ] ))(()()( TXarxaeTTe TTrljaojaTr −=− −− pipi                                                                        (22) 
 If we replace in (22) , )(Tojapi and )(Tljapi  by their expressions (Eqs 6), we obtain (23). 
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 We can deduce from (23) that at any given date t, there is a rank aj  such that condition (24) holds. 
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   We assume that aj is the critical rang above which firm can not adopt the new technology, in period t. Hence 
all o-firms which are larger and more efficient than firm aj (i.e. which have lower rank than aj ), adopt in this 
period. The total number of firms which adopt in period t is given by Eqs: ))()(()( tntnjtn lhaa +−=     (25) 
One gets the expression of aj given by : )()()( tntntnj lhaa ++=                                                (26) 
 
 The o-firms exit decision: 
 
The exit decision is made prior to observing next period’s efficiency level and will involve a reservation rule:  
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A firm using the old technology will exit the industry the first time its rank gets above this reservation value jˆ , 
i.e. the first time jj ˆ> .  Thus the number of o-firms exits, )( tsn o , is given by: jtntsn o ˆ)()( −=          (28)  
 Finally there exists, for any given t, a critical rank jˆ such that (29) is respected. ((29) is obtained by combining 
(6), (7) and (27) ) : ( )
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The l and h-firms exit decisions: 
The exit decision is made by h- and l-firms prior to observing next period’s efficiency level )( tc lj  (or hc  if 
technical success) and will involve a reservation rule:  
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    A firm using the new technology will exit the industry the first time its rank gets above this reservation value 
*j , i.e. the first time *jj> .  Thus the number of exits of l- and h-firms, ( )tsn i , is given by: 
  
*)()()( jtntntsn lhi −+=                                                                                                                  (31) 
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Finally there exists, for any given t, a critical rank *j such that (32) holds. (Eqs(32) is obtained by combining 
(6),(8) and (30) ) : ( )
il
j
l
jt
t
oo
t
ll
t
hh
StctvF
EcmtjAl
tncmtncmtnc
β
θ
−+
=+++
))(,(
),(.
))()()((1
**
*
               (32) 
By combining (24) and (29) we obtain (33):  
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The number of exit of o-firms (Eqs 34) is obtained by replacing (33) and (26) in (28): 
 
 
[ ] [ ])()()()()()1)(()(1)( tntntntUtntUttsn lhaooo ++−−+= ξ                              (34) 
 
Substituting this in (34), the number of o-firms operating in the industry in period t+1 can be expressed as: 
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Eqs (36) is obtained by combining (24) and (32): )()1)(()()(* tntUtjtUj iai −−= ξ                         (36)  
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If we substitute (36) and (26) in (31), the number of innovating firms exit becomes: 
              
)()1)(()()()())(1())()(()( tntUttntUtUtntntsn iaiilhi −+−−+= ξ                        (37) 
The total number of l-firms becomes by replacing (37) in (15): 
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 Innovative firms’ entry decisions: 
An entrant elj , using the new technology, maximizes the discounted value of total profits by choosing the entry 
date elT .  Denoting the profit function as )( elj TelΠ  the optimization problem of this entrant is as follow:   
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The model’s results: 
 
      Endogenous variables are solved in the Appendix 1. The numerical simulations of their expression show that 
industry concentration affects the diffusion of new technology among firms. It has a positive effect on the 
average probability of adoption. (Which is consistent with the schumpeterian assumption, according to which 
monopolistic profits are required to finance research and learning expenditures); and becomes inhibiting when it 
reaches a high critical level. We can thus deduce that the significant inter-firm variation in technical efficiency in 
developing countries which is the source of average inefficiencies of their industries prevent the adoption of new 
technologies and thus the productivity improvement in this countries. 
     We found that an improvement of the productivity of less efficient entering firms towards that of domestic 
best practice by supporting their learning and research processes reduces the industry heterogeneity. Economies 
of scale (high fixed costs) rise industry concentration, which increases in the adoption, learning, and entry costs.  
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We have shown that competitive policy reform  has a strictly positive effect on the average probability of 
adoption and lead to some firms moving toward best practice while overall inter-firm variance in productivity 
increases. Together with policy reform, industry-specific training and technical assistance programs might help 
to overcome this problem. Finally, we find that the innovation effectiveness increases the probability of adoption 
and decreases the average probability of technological success of innovating firms.  
 
LIMITATION OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE STUDIES 
   The framework developed here does not formalize explicitly technological externalities inherent to  learning 
process  but seems to be sufficiently flexible and simple to include this effect. In this article we have presented 
only results concerning adoption learning and efficiency. Results on the dynamics of entry, exit and industry 
evolution are discussed in another paper.  
 
APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 
From Eqs(24) we can deduce: ))()()(()())1()1()1(( 11 tncmtncmtncttncmtncmtnc ootllthhaootllthh ++Ω=+++++ ++  
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parameter.   In the left side of (39) we replace )1( +tn h , )1( +tn l and )1( +tn o by their expressions given, respectively, by (10) (38) and 
(35). We obtain (40). 
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Multiplying (2) by ))()(( tth ξ− and (3) by ))(1( tξ−  gives respectively (2’) and (3’): 
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  From (4’) we solve h(t):
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)2()()(
)()())(1()()()(
)(
11
11
ρ
ξρξρ
 
where ))()(()( 11 otoltllth cmtecmtecmcD ++ +−=  and 1)( −= tx ξ  
There are 16 possible cases for entry and exit dynamic: 
 Case 1: is the general case presented in appendix 1: 0)(,0)(,0)(,0)( ≥≥≥≥ tnstnstete olol ,Case 2: Some l and o-firms enter 
but no exit: ( 0)(,0)(,0)(,0)( ==≥≥ tnstnstete olol  Case 3: Some l and o-firms enter, only o-firms quit 
0)(,0)(,0)(,0)( ≥=≥≥ tnstnstete olol ,Case 4:Some l and o-firms enter bur only l-firms quit etc… From these particular cases 
we derive a system of eight  equations with eight endogenous variables  ( l
t
o
t
l
t
o
t
oi cmcmcmcmtetetth 11 ,,,),(,)(,)(,)( ++ρ ). 
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Figure 2-a: The concentration effect on the probability of 
technical success
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Figure 2-b: The effect of competition on the probability of  technical 
success
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Figure 1-a: The competition effect on the 
average probability of adoption
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Figure 1-b: The concentration effect on the average 
probability of adoption
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